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Abstract
We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private informa-
tion. We analyze how the structure of the private information shapes the market power of each
agent and the price volatility. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique
equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. In par-
ticular, regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may
be arbitrarily close to zero (so we obtain the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no
trade in equilibrium). By contrast, price volatility is always less than the variance of the aggregate
shock across agents across all information structures, hence we can provide sharp and robust bounds
on some but not all equilibrium statistics.
We then compare demand function competition with a different uniform price trading mechanism,
namely Cournot competition. Interestingly, in Cournot competition, the market power is uniquely
determined while the price volatility cannot be bounded by the variance of the aggregate shock.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Results
Models of demand function competition (or equivalently, supply function competition) are a cornerstone
to the analysis of markets in industrial organization and finance. Economic agents submit demand
functions and an auctioneer chooses a price that clears the market. Demand function competition is
an accurate description of many important economic markets, such as treasury auctions or electricity
markets. In addition, it can be seen as a stylized representation of many other markets, where there
may not be an actual auctioneer but agents can condition their bids on market prices and markets clear
at equilibrium prices.
Under complete information, there is a well known multiplicity of equilibria under demand function
competition (see Klemperer and Meyer (1989)). In particular, under demand function competition, the
degree of market power —which measures the distortion of the allocation as a result of strategic with-
holding of demand —is indeterminate. This indeterminacy arises because, under complete information,
an agent is indifferent about what demand to submit at prices that do not arise in equilibrium. Making
the realistic assumption that there is incomplete information removes the indeterminacy because every
price can arise with positive probability in equilibrium. We therefore analyze demand function com-
petition under incomplete information (Vives (2011)). We consider a setting where a finite number of
agents have linear-quadratic preferences over their holdings of a divisible good, and the marginal utility
of an agent is determined by a payoff shock; we restrict attention to symmetric environments (in terms
of payoff shocks and information structures) and symmetric linear Nash equilibria.
The outcome of demand function competition under incomplete information will depend on the
fundamentals of the economic environment - the number of agents and the distribution of payoff shocks
- but also on which information structure is assumed. However, it will rarely be clear what would
be reasonable assumptions to make about the information structure. We therefore examine if it is
possible to make predictions about outcomes under demand function competition in a given economic
environment that are robust to the exact modelling of the information structure.
Our first main result establishes the impossibility of robust predictions about market power. We show
that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure
that is arbitrarily close to complete information. In particular, regardless of the number of agents
and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (so we obtain the
competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade in equilibrium). The reason is that,
when there is incomplete information, prices convey information to agents. The slope of the demand
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function an agent submits will then depend on what information is being revealed, and this will pin
down market power in equilibrium.
While the information structures giving rise to extremal outcomes are special, we document that
the sensitivity to fine details of the information structure arises for very natural information structures.
We give one illustration here. We can always decompose agents’payoff shocks into idiosyncratic and
common components. If there was common knowledge of the common component, but agents observed
noisy signals of their idiosyncratic component, there would be a unique equilibrium and we can identify
the market power as the noise goes to zero. If instead there was common knowledge of the idiosyncratic
components, but each agent observed a different noisy signal of the common component, there will be
a different unique equilibrium and a different market power in the limit as the noise goes to zero. In
the latter case, unlike in the former case, higher prices will reveal positive information about the value
of the good to agents and, as a result, agents will submit less price elastic demand functions and there
will be high market power. More generally, if agents have distinct noisy but accurate signals of the
idiosyncratic and common components of payoff shocks of the other traders, then market power will be
determined by the relative accuracy of the signals, even when all signals are very accurate.
Given the sharp indeterminacy in the level of market power induced by the information structure,
it is natural to ask what predictions– if any– hold across all information structures.
Our second main result shows that —for any level of market power — price volatility is always (that is,
regardless of the information structure) less than the price volatility that is achieved by an equilibrium
under complete information. A direct corollary of our result is that price volatility is less than the
variance of the average shock across agents across all information structures. Hence, we show that it
is possible to provide sharp bounds on some equilibrium statistics, which hold across all information
structures.
The first two results in our paper focus on market power and price volatility. There are two nat-
ural questions that follow: (i) to what extent can we study other possible statistics of an equilibrium
outcome?, and (ii) how many statistics of an equilibrium outcome are necessary to consider in order to
fully determine an equilibrium outcome?
The third main result of our paper characterizes the set of outcomes that can be achieved in demand
function competition in terms of necessary and suffi cient conditions. We show that any distribution of
outcomes – that is, any distribution of quantities, payoff shocks and prices– that is an equilibrium
outcome is fully determined by only 3 statistics. The first two statistic are essentially the level of
market power and price volatility, while the third statistic is the dispersion in the quantities bought by
agents. Once these three statistics have been determined all other moments of an equilibrium outcome
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are uniquely pinned down by the equilibrium conditions and the payoff structure of the game.
The methodology used to study volatility bounds can also be used to compare the set of outcomes of
different trading mechanisms across all information structures. We define a distribution of outcomes as
the joint distribution of quantities, payoff shocks and price that is induced by an equilibrium outcome.
A distribution of outcomes provides a description of the outcome of demand function competition that
allows the analyst to abstract from the strategies used in equilibrium and the precise description of
the information structure. The key conceptual innovation is to describe the outcomes of the demand
function competition game not in terms of the strategies used by the agents (that is, the demand
functions), but instead, in terms of the induced economic outcomes (purchased quantity and price) and
payoff shocks.
A critical advantage of the focus on the distribution of outcomes is that it can be easily compared
with the distribution of outcomes induced by any other trading mechanisms. In the paper we focus our
analysis in comparing demand function competition with Cournot competition, as a particular instance
of what we call uniform price mechanism. The set of possible first moments under demand function
competition has one more degree of freedom than under Cournot competition, while the set of possible
second moments under demand function competition has one less degree of freedom than under Cournot
competition. This apparently abstract description of the two mechanisms allow us to conclude that price
volatility is bounded by the size of aggregate shocks in demand function competition, while in Cournot
competition price volatility cannot be bounded by the size of the aggregate shocks. By contrast, the
first moment, the market power, or the average volume of trade is uniquely determined in the Cournot
competition (unlike in demand function competition).
1.2 Related Literature
The multiplicity of equilibria in demand function competition under complete information was identified
by Wilson (1979), Grossman (1981) and Hart (1985), see also Vives (1999) for a more detailed account.
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) emphasized that the complete information multiplicity was driven by the
fact that agents’demand at non-equilibrium prices was indeterminate. They showed that introducing
noise that pinned down best responses lead to a unique equilibrium and thus determinate market power.
And they showed that the equilibrium selected was independent of shape of the noise, as the noise became
small. They were thus able to offer a compelling prediction about market power. Our results show
that their results rely on a maintained private values assumption, implying that agents cannot learn
from prices. We replicate the Klemperer and Meyer (1989) finding that small perturbations select a
unique equilibrium but - by allowing for the possibility of a common value component of values - we
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can say nothing about market power in the perturbed equilibria.
Vives (2011) pioneered the study of asymmetric information under demand function competition,
and we work in his setting of linear-quadratic payoffs and interdependent values. He studied a particular
class of information structures where each trader observes a noisy signal of his own payoff type. We
study what happens for all information structures. We show that the impact of asymmetric information
on the equilibrium market power can even be larger than the ones derived from the one-dimensional
signals studied in Vives (2011). Our results overturn some of the comparative statics and bounds that
are found using the specific class of one-dimensional signal structures. In particular, in this paper but
not in Vives (2011) market power can be large even when any of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) the amount of asymmetric information is small, (ii) the number of players is large, or (iii) payoff
shocks are independently distributed.
Bergemann and Morris (2016) described a general approach for finding equilibria under all informa-
tion structures in a given game and Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2015b) used this methodology
in the context of a symmetric game with quadratic payoffs and normal uncertainty. An innovation of
this paper with respect to this earlier literature is that we characterize economic outcomes arising in
equilibrium (quantities and prices), abstracting from strategic choices (i.e., demand functions). This
methodological extension allows a novel comparison of alternative mechanisms, i.e., demand function
and Cournot competition.
Our "anything goes" result for market power has the same flavor as abstract game theory results
establishing that fine details of the information structure can be chosen to select among multiple ra-
tionalizable or equilibrium outcomes of complete information games (Rubinstein (1989) and Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007)). Our result is an illustration of the practical importance of these ideas. Demand
function competition under complete information is a game with a large degree of indeterminacy built
in. Our results show that in this context very natural perturbations lead to very dramatic equilibrium
selection. In particular, we do not make an assumption analogous to the "richness" assumption in
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), which in our context would require the strong assumption that there exist
"types" with a dominant strategy to submit particular demand functions.
5
2 Model
PayoffEnvironment There are N agents who have demand for a divisible good. The utility of agent
i ∈ {1, ..., N} who buys q ∈ R units of the good at price p ∈ R is given by:




where θi ∈ R is the payoff shock of agent i. The payoff shock θi describes the marginal willingness to
pay of agent i for the good at q = 0. The payoff shocks are symmetrically and normally distributed













where ρθθ is the correlation coeffi cient between the payoff shocks θi and θj .























The supply of the good is given by an exogenous supply function S(p) as represented by a linear
inverse supply function with α, β ∈ R+:
p(q) = α+ βq. (3)
For notational simplicity, we normalize the intercept α of the affi ne supply function to zero.
Information Structure Each agent i observes a multi-dimensional signals si ∈ RJ about the payoff
shocks:
si , (si1, ..., sij , ..., siJ).
The joint distribution of signals and payoff shocks
(s1, ..., sN , θ1, ..., θN )
is symmetrically and normally distributed. We discuss specific examples of multivariate normal infor-
mation structures in the following sections.
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Demand Function Competition The agents compete via demand functions. Each agent i submits
a demand function xi : RJ+1 → R that specifies the demanded quantity as a function of the received
signal si and the market price p, denoted by xi (si, p). The Walrasian auctioneer sets a price p∗ such






We study the Nash equilibrium of the demand function competition game. The strategy profile
(x∗1, ..., x
∗
N ) forms a Nash equilibrium if:
















x∗j (sj , p
∗)).
We say a Nash equilibrium (x∗1, ..., x
∗
N ) is linear and symmetric if there exists (c0, ..., cJ ,m) ∈ RJ+2 such
that for all i ∈ N :




Throughout the paper we focus on symmetric linear Nash equilibria and so hereafter we drop the
qualifications “symmetric”and “linear”. When we say an equilibrium is unique, we refer to uniqueness
within this class of equilibria. In a linear-quadric setting like ours, Du and Zhu (2017) show that there
does not exist a nonlinear ex post equilibrium.1
Equilibrium Statistics: Market Power and Price Volatility We analyze the set of equilibrium
outcomes in demand function competition under incomplete information. We frequently describe the
equilibrium outcome through two central statistics of the equilibrium: market power and price volatility.
The marginal utility of agent i from consuming the qi-th unit of the good is θi − qi. We define the
market power of agent i as the difference between the agent’s marginal utility and the equilibrium price
divided by the equilibrium price:
li ,
θi − qi − p
p
.
This is the natural demand side analogue of the supply side price markup defined by Lerner (1934),


















1They focus on a model in which the agents observe one-dimensional signals and the supply of the asset is inelastic.
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The market power l is defined as the expected average of the Lerner index across all agents. If the
agents were price takers, then the market power would be l = 0.
A second equilibrium statistic of interest is price volatility, the variance of the equilibrium price,
which we denote by:
σ2p , var(p). (6)
Price volatility measures the ex ante uncertainty about the equilibrium price. In the subsequent analysis
we find that market power is proportional to the aggregate demand, and that price volatility is propor-
tional to the variance of aggregate demand. Thus, these two equilibrium statistics will represent the
first and second moments of the aggregate equilibrium demand.
3 Complete Information: A Review
We first review what happens in demand function competition with complete information. That is,
every agent i observes the entire vector of payoff shocks (θ1, ..., θN ) before submitting his demand
xi (θ, p). This is a natural starting point to understand the essential elements of demand function
competition and allows us to introduce some key ideas. The set of equilibrium outcomes under complete
information will play a key role in identifying what happens under incomplete information.
The residual supply faced by agent i will be determined by the demand functions of all the agents
other than i. We suppress the dependence of the demand function on the vector θ in this section for





Agent i can then be viewed as a monopsonist over his residual supply. That is, if agent i submits
demand xi(p), then the equilibrium price p∗ satisfies xi(p∗) = ri(p∗) for every i. Hence, agent i only
needs to determine what is the optimal point along the curve ri(p); this will determine the quantity
that agent i purchases and the equilibrium price.



















It is easy to check that λi determines how much demand agent i withholds to decrease the price at
which he purchases the good. For example, if λi = 0, then agent i behaves as a price taker. As λi
increases, agent i withholds more demand to decrease the equilibrium price. Hence, λi determines the
incentive of agent i to withhold demand to decrease the price.
In the complete information setting, there is a well known indeterminacy of equilibrium price impact.
If agent j submits a suffi ciently elastic demand, then the price impact of agent i will be close to 0; any
increase in the quantity bought by agent i will be offset by a decrease in the quantity bought by agent
j, keeping the equilibrium price unchanged. If agent j submits a suffi ciently inelastic demand, then the
price impact of agent i may be arbitrarily large; any increase in the quantity bought by agent i will be
reinforced by an increase in the quantity bought by agent j, leading to arbitrarily large changes in the
equilibrium price.
We characterize the set of symmetric linear Nash equilibria. In this class of Nash equilibria all
agents have the same price impact, and the price impact is independent of the realization of the shocks
(θ1, ..., θN ). We focus on the equilibrium price impact and the equilibrium price.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium with Complete Information)








Proposition 1 characterizes the price impact and equilibrium price in a continuum of equilibria
parametrized by the price impact λ. As the price impact λ increases, every agent withholds more
demand to lower the price. This leads to a lower equilibrium price. It is easy to check that, for every
λ ≥ −1/2, the equilibrium quantity bought by agent i is given by:
qi =
1














Thus, as the price impact λ increases, not only does the price decrease, but also the differences between
the quantity bought by agent i and agent j decreases. Thus, as price impact increases, the equilibrium
becomes less effi cient because the total quantity demanded by all agents is too small (which leads to a
lower price) and the quantities are ineffi ciently allocated across agents.
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It is informative to describe the symmetric linear Nash equilibria in terms of the equilibrium statis-
tics, market power l and price volatility σ2p, as defined earlier.
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium Statistics with Complete Information)
In the symmetric linear Nash equilibrium under complete information with price impact λ ≥ −12 , market










Market power is a linear function of price impact as the price impact determines how much an agent
withholds demand in order to lower prices. Similarly, the equilibrium price (8) is decreasing in the
level of price impact. As the price impact increases, agents buy less, which leads to less volatility as a
function of the payoff shocks.
By looking at (9), we can see that there is a direct relation between price volatility and market
power. Thus we know that market power l is only bounded from below by
l ≥ − 1
2βN
, (10)
and that the price volatility can be directly expressed in terms of the market power:
σ2p =
(βN)2




In Figure 1 we plot all feasible equilibrium pairs of market power and price volatility that can be a
achieved under complete information. The equilibrium outcome that would be attained under complete
information if we selected the outcome using the equilibrium selection proposed by Klemperer and
Meyer (1989) is depicted in Point A. As we study other information structures, we will appeal to a
graphic representation of all possible pairs of market power and price volatility similar to Figure 1.
The reason for multiple equilibria is that each agent has multiple best responses. In particular, there
are multiple affi ne functions xi(p) that intercept with ri(p) at the same point. Agent i is indifferent
between the multiple demand functions that intercept with ri(p) at the same point. Yet, the slope of
xi(p) determines the slope of rj(p), which is important for agent j; a more inelastic demand of agent
i leads to a higher price impact for agent j. By changing the slope of the demands that each agent
submits, it is possible to generate different equilibria that lead to different outcomes.
The multiplicity is an artifact of the complete information assumption. With incomplete information,
agents’best responses will typically be pinned down everywhere and there will be a unique equilibrium





















of market power and price volatility with complete information
(β = 1, N = 3) .
4 Market Power and Price Volatility
We now study the set of equilibrium outcomes in demand function competition under incomplete in-
formation, focussing on two statistics of equilibrium outcomes: market power and price volatility. Our
approach in this paper is to ask what can happen for all information structures. But we illustrate our
main results by studying the equilibrium outcomes induced by “natural”information structures – that
is, information structures that have a straightforward interpretation and have appeared in the earlier
literature. These examples will illustrate how a given information structure dramatically impacts the
structure of the equilibrium and provide some initial intuition for where the bounds come from.
4.1 Robust Predictions about Market Power and Price Volatility
With incomplete information, market power and price volatility will be uniquely pinned down given a
specific information structure. What robust predictions can be made then that do not depend on the
fine details of the information structure? We will show that we cannot make any robust predictions
about market power: any positive market power can arise as the unique equilibrium even when we
restrict to arbitrarily small amounts of incomplete information. But we can make a sharp prediction
about price volatility: no matter the amount of incomplete information, it cannot be higher than what
happens in complete information.
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We say that an information structure is ε−close to complete information if the conditional variance
of the estimate of each payoff shock θj is small given the signal received by agent i:
∀i, j ∈ N, var(θj |si) < ε. (12)
In an information structure that is ε-close to complete information an agent can observe his own payoff
shock and the payoff shock of the other agents with a residual uncertainty of at most ε. If an information
structure is ε−close to complete information for a suffi ciently small ε, then the information structure will
effectively be a perturbation of complete information. We now show that any equilibrium under complete
information can be selected as the unique equilibrium in a perturbation of complete information.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Selection)











there exists an information structure that is ε−close to complete information and induces (l, σ2p) as the
unique equilibrium.
Theorem 1 shows that all combinations of market power and price volatility that can be achieved
as an equilibrium under complete information can also be achieved as a unique equilibrium in an infor-
mation structure that is close to complete information. In fact, the result is stronger, every equilibrium
outcome under complete information is the unique equilibrium outcome of an information structure
that is close to complete information.
The proof of Theorem 1, relegated to the Appendix, uses a class of information structures that
we refer to as noise-free signals. In the next section, we augment our understanding of how private
information determines price volatility and market power using information structures that appeared
in earlier work.
Theorem 1 shows that, (i) all equilibrium outcomes under complete information can turn into
unique equilibrium outcomes under incomplete information, and (ii) restricting attention to information
structures close to complete information do not allow us to provide sharper predictions about market
power and price volatility. The large indeterminacy in the set of possible outcomes suggests that it is
diffi cult to offer robust predictions for market power under demand function competition. By contrast,
it is possible to provide sharp predictions regarding price volatility with demand function competition.
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Theorem 2 (Equilibria Under All Information Structures)












Moreover, all feasible pairs (l, σ2p) are induced by a unique equilibrium for some information structure.
Theorem 2 provides a sharp bound on all possible equilibrium outcomes. It shows that the equi-
librium outcome is bounded by the outcomes that are achieved under complete information. Thus the
outcomes that arise under complete information can be seen as the “upper boundary” of the set of
outcomes that can arise under all information structures.
The “if”part of the statement closely resembles the proof of Theorem 1. In particular, the set of
market power and price volatility that satisfy (13) would be achieved under complete information if
one could reduce the variance of the aggregate shocks (i.e. by making var( 1N
∑
i∈N θi) smaller). By
decomposing the payoff shocks into an observable and a non-observable component, we can effectively
achieve the same outcomes as if there was complete information but the variance of the shocks was
smaller.
The “only if”part of the statement is economically more interesting because it uses the restrictions








That is, the equilibrium price is proportional to the average of the agents’expected payoff shocks. It
is crucial that the expected payoff shock of agent i is computed conditional on the equilibrium price
– this is an implication of the fact that agents compete in demand functions and hence agent i can
condition the quantity he buys on the equilibrium price. The fact that an agent can condition on the
equilibrium price disciplines beliefs, which ultimately allows us to bound the price volatility. As we
discuss in Section 6, in Cournot competition agents cannot condition the quantity they buy on the
equilibrium price, which may result in unbounded volatility even if the volatility of the average shock
is arbitrarily small.
4.2 How Private Information Determines Market Power and Price Volatility
We now study three different parametrized classes of information structures: (i) noisy one-dimensional
signals, (ii) multi-dimensional signals, and (iii) confounding signals. We study market power and price
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volatility under these three information structures and use this to provide an intuition of different
elements that come into play in our main results, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Under noisy one-dimensional signals, market power always increases with the amount of incomplete
information, and large market power can only be induced by a large amount of incomplete information.
These are the key findings of Vives (2011), but we will see that they are special to this information
structure and in particular will not hold for the others that we consider in this section. If agents
observe multidimensional signals, the equilibrium outcomes closely track – within some range– the
set of outcomes under complete information. We use these signals to provide an intuition of why
small amounts of incomplete information can lead to large variations in market power. Finally, the
confounding signals provide a set of information structures in which market power is less than the one
induced by the complete information selection proposed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), which leads
to a higher price volatility.
One-Dimensional Noisy Signals The first information structure consists of one-dimensional noisy
signals. Each agent observes his payoff state with conditionally independent noise. That is, agent i
observes the noisy one-dimensional signal
si = θi + γεi, (15)
where the noise terms {εi}i∈N are independent standard normal. Vives (2011) uses a noisy one-
dimensional signal to study the impact of incomplete information on market power. The one-dimensional
noisy signals are parametrized by a one-dimensional parameter: the standard deviation of the noise term
γ ∈ [0,∞). For every γ, there is a unique linear Nash equilibrium.
In Figure 2 we plot in a yellow curve the set of market power and price volatility that are achieved by
one-dimensional noisy signals for all γ ∈ R (the red dashed curve is the set of outcomes under complete
information). Point A corresponds to the outcome when γ = 0: an agent knows his own payoff shock
but remains uncertain about the payoff shock of other agents. Market power is increasing in γ and price
volatility is decreasing in γ. Market power increases with γ because – as the signals becomes more
noisy – relative to si, signal sj becomes more informative about θi. So agent i wants to buy a larger
quantity when agent j observes a high signal. For this reason, agent i submits a more inelastic demand;
this increases the correlation between the quantity he buys and the quantity bought by agent j. This
in turn increase the market power of agent j.
The price volatility decreases because market power increases (as in complete information equilibria)





















of market power and price volatility under noisy one-
dimensional signals.
volatility decreases at a faster rate (as a function of market power) than under complete information.
Therefore, there is a tight link between market power and a price that is less informative and less
volatile.
We assumed that the individual payoff shocks θi and θj were positively but not perfectly correlated.
The most natural reason for this is that they reflect common and idiosyncratic components. This
suggests that we decompose the payoff shocks into a common and an idiosyncratic component, ω and
τ i respectively:
θi = ω + τ i, (16)
where ω and {τ i}i∈N are normally distributed and independent of each other.2 It is now natural to
allow information to reflect common and idiosyncratic components in different ways.
Multi-Dimensional Noisy Signals Our second information structure consists of noisy multi-
dimensional signals. Each agent observes a separate noisy signal about all the idiosyncratic and the
2Given our assumption that the θi were normally distributed with mean 0, standard deviation σθ and correlation ρθθ,















common components in the payoff state, and thus each agent i observes N + 1 signals:
∀i ∈ N, sii = τ i, (17)
∀j 6= i ∈ N, sij = τ j + δεij , (18)
∀i ∈ N, siω = ω + γεiω (19)
where all noise terms are again independent standard normal. Agents know their own idiosyncratic
component for sure. They additionally have signals of others’ idiosyncratic components, which we
assume to be very accurate (i.e., 0 < δ  1). The multidimensional signals are parametrized by a
one-dimensional parameter: the standard deviation of noise on the common component γ ∈ [0,∞). For
every γ, there is a unique linear Nash equilibrium.
In Figure 3 we plot the set of market power and price volatility that are achieved by multi-dimensional
noisy signals for all γ ∈ R in a green curve (the red dashed curve is the set of outcomes under complete
information). As before, point A corresponds to the outcome when γ = 0: an agent knows his own
payoff shock but remains uncertain about the payoff shocks of the other agents. Initially, as γ increases,
market power increases. The intuition is similar to the case of one-dimensional noisy signals; because
agents have interdependent values an agent wants to increase the correlation between the quantity he
buys and the quantity bought by other agents. But as γ → ∞ the signals about the common shock
become irrelevant, and so we are back to the case in which all the relevant sources of uncertainty are
the idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore as γ →∞, market power is reduced back to the same level as γ = 0,
but with lower volatility because the price does not reflect the common component.
The picture illustrates that the set of market power and price volatility under multi-dimensional
signals “tracks”very closely the set of outcomes under complete information. The agents are effectively
close to complete information as each agent i observes precise signals about {τ j}j∈N and ω. The market
power is determined by agent i’s relative uncertainty about τ j and ω rather than by an absolute level of
uncertainty. Thus even close to complete information, we can have large changes in the induced level of
market power and price volatility. Point B in Figure 3 corresponds to a point in which both δ and γ are
small, but γ is relatively larger than δ.3 This degree of uncertainty about payoff shocks did not have
a significant impact in the case of one-dimensional normal signals because relative uncertainty about
common and idiosyncratic components was not present.
Market power is equal to 1 when agents have common values; this would happen if an agent observed
perfectly the idiosyncratic shock of other agents (i.e. if the variance of the noise in (18) was 0 instead
3The parametrization is given by δ = 0.01 and γ = 0.53. The variances of the payoff shocks are given by στ = 1 and























of market power and price volatility under noisy one-
dimensional signals.
of δ). In this case, the price perfectly reveals the expected value of ω conditional on all private signals.
So an increase in the quantity bought by agent i leads to an equal increase in the quantity bought
by all other agents. Although a small amount of incomplete information can generate a large market
power, in our multi-dimensional signals example, market power is never above 1. However, Theorem
1 establishes that there is no upper bound on market power across all information structures. This is
because it is possible to construct information structures in which an increase in the quantity bought
by agent i leads to an even bigger increase in the quantity bought by all other agents, which in turns
leads to a market power larger than 1.
Confounding Signals The third information structure consists of confounding signals. Each agent
observes a weighted sum of the common and idiosyncratic components of his payoff state. Agent i
observes the confounding signal:
si = τ i + γω, (20)
with γ ∈ R (note that we allow for γ < 0). Here there is no noise, but the one-dimensional signal
may disproportionately reflect either the common component or the idiosyncratic component. The
confounding signals are parametrized by a one-dimensional parameter: the confounding parameter
γ ∈ R. For every γ, there is a unique linear Nash equilibrium.
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An alternative representation of the confounding signals is to note that θi can be written as
θi = v(si, ω),
where v(·, ·) is a linear function. Hence, the utility of agent i depends directly on the signal si that he
observes and on the realization of a common value shock. In addition the signals are independently
distributed across agents conditional on ω. Information structures similar to (20) have been used by
Wilson (1977) and Reny and Perry (2006), among others.
In Figure 4 we plot the set of market power and price volatility that are achieved by one-dimensional
noisy signals for all γ ∈ R in the blue curve (the red dashed curve is the set of outcomes under complete
information). In this case, point A corresponds to the outcome when γ = 1. As γ decreases to 0, the
market power and price volatility approaches point D. As γ diverges to ∞, the market power and price
volatility approaches point C. The rest of the points are achieved by a negative γ.
It is clear to see that point C (achieved in the limit γ →∞) already achieves a higher price volatility
and a lower market power than point A (a possibility that did not arise with the noisy multi-dimensional
signals example). The reason is that a high signal of agent j is indicative of a low shock of agent i.
Hence, agent i submits a more elastic demand, in order to decrease the correlation between the quantity
he buys and the quantity bought by agent j. This in turn decreases the market power of agent j and
increases the price volatility.
We note that it is even possible to achieve negative market power. This happens when a good signal
for agent i is suffi ciently negative information for agent j. In this case, when agent i increases the
quantity he buys, this induces an even bigger decrease in the total quantity bought by the other agents.
Hence, overall, when agent i buys a larger quantity the price decreases (due to the response of other
agents).
We used three information structures to provide an intuition of how private information impacts
market power and price volatility. Each of these information structures yield different comparative
statics and can be used to understand how information determines the equilibrium outcome. The
fact that it was necessary to study three “natural” information structures to account for the richness
that come into play in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 should also be a sign of caution; this illustrates
how sensitive the set of possible equilibrium outcomes are to the exact specification of the information
structure. An analyst, when assuming a specific information structure, may be inadvertently imposing
severe restrictions on the set outcomes that are being considered. Thus, we seek predictions regarding
























of market power and price volatility under confounding signals.
5 The Entire Set of Equilibrium Outcomes
In Section 4 we studied how the structure of private information can determine market power and
price volatility. We showed that the set of outcomes under complete information completely captures
the set of all possible equilibrium pairs of market power and price volatility that can be attained with
any information structure. There are two natural questions that follow: (i) does the set of complete
information equilibria also identify the set of all possible outcomes if we consider other relevant statistics
of an equilibrium outcome; and (ii) can we characterize all moments of the equilibrium outcomes rather
than a lower dimensional subset of statistics? We now answer both of these questions by characterizing
the set of all possible equilibrium outcomes.
5.1 Distribution of Outcomes
We provide a description of the equilibrium outcomes from an ex ante perspective. We say that the
joint distribution of variables (θ1, ..., θN , q1, ..., qN , p) is an outcome distribution of the demand function
competition if the distribution is induced by an equilibrium outcome. The advantage of the description
in terms of distributions of equilibrium outcomes is that it does not depend on the detailed description
of the information structure. That is, two information structures may induce different beliefs and may
induce different realizations over outcomes ex post, but as long as the distribution of outcomes ex ante
is the same, these two information structures will be indistinguishable in terms of outcomes.
19
Since we focus on symmetric outcomes, we can simplify the description of the distribution. We











In symmetric environments, the joint distribution of variables (θ1, ..., θN , q1, ..., qN , p) is fully determined
by the joint distribution of variables (θi, θ̄, qi, q̄, p). That is, we can focus attention on the joint distrib-
ution of the payoff shock and quantity of an individual agent with the corresponding averages. Finally,
since the average quantity q̄ is collinear with the price p due to the market clearing condition, we can
omit the average quantity and we simply describe the joint distribution of variables (θi, θ̄, qi, p).
In the multivariate normal environment, the joint distribution is hence completely characterized by



























Some of the coeffi cients are part of the distribution of payoff shocks, and hence, they are exogenously
determined: (i) the expected payoff shock of every agent (µθ), (ii) the expected average payoff shock
(µθ̄), (iii) the variance of the payoff shock of an agent σ
2
θ, (iv) the variance of the average payoff shock
σ2
θ̄
, and (v) the correlation between the payoff shock of an agent and the average payoff shock (ρθθ̄).
The rest of the coeffi cients are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcome.
The joint distribution of outcomes thus contains nine endogenous variables: (i) the mean quantity
bought by agent (µq) , (ii) the mean price (µp), (iii) the variance of the quantity bought by an agent
(σ2q), (iv) the price volatility (σ
2
p), (v) the correlation between the price and the payoff shock of an agent
(ρpθ), (vi) the correlation between the price and the average payoff shock (ρpθ̄), (vii) the correlation
between the quantity bought by an agent and the payoff shock of this agent (ρqθ), (viii) the correlation
between the quantity bought by an agent and the average payoffshock (ρqθ̄), (ix) the correlation between
the quantity bought by an agent and the price (ρqp).
To characterize the set of all possible feasible distributions it is useful to define the orthogonal
components in the payoffs shocks and the demanded quantities:
∆θi , θi − θ and ∆qi , qi − q.
The variable ∆θi is the difference between the payoff shock of agent i and the average payoff shock (and





The correlation ρ∆q∆θ is an economically important quantity; it measures how effi ciently the good is
allocated across agents. In other words, the correlation ρ∆q∆θ measures how much of the dispersion
in the allocation across agents is caused by fundamental shocks and how much it is caused by noise.
Note that ∆θi is a linear combination of the variables θi and θ̄, while ∆qi is a linear combination of the
variables qi and p. Hence, the distribution (21) completely determines the correlation ρ∆qi,∆θi .
5.2 Set of Feasible Distributions
We now provide a description of all equilibrium outcome distributions. For this it is useful to note that
any distribution (21) completely determines the induced market power (as defined in (5)).
Theorem 3 (Set of Feasible Outcomes)
There exists an information structure that induces outcome distribution (21) if and only if the induced
triple (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ) satisfies:
l ≥ − 1
2βN
; ρpθ̄ ∈ [0, 1] ; ρ∆q∆θ ∈ [0, 1]. (22)
The theorem characterizes the set of all outcome distributions that can be implemented as a Nash
equilibrium of the demand function competition game for some information structure. The theorem
provides two different results regarding the set of outcomes. First, it shows that an equilibrium outcome
is fully determined by the triple (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ). Hence, any other moment of the distribution can
be inferred simply from observing these three coeffi cients. Second, it establishes that there are few
restrictions on the set of feasible triples (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ). More precisely, the only restrictions on these
three coeffi cients are: (i) market power is bounded from below by −1/2βN , and (ii) the correlations
are positive. Thus, the equilibrium conditions of demand function competition impose essentially no
restrictions on these three coeffi cients – not even the distribution of payoff shocks (which is exogenous)
imposes any restrictions on the triple (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ).
We now describe how the triple (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ) determines the distribution of outcomes. We distin-
guish between two types of restrictions (i) statistical restrictions that are independent of the equilibrium
conditions (that is, they hold for any strategy profile of agents, not only the equilibrium ones), and (ii)
restrictions imposed by the equilibrium conditions. Among the latter ones, we separate the restrictions
imposed on the first and second moments of the distribution.
The equilibrium conditions are derived using the individual best response conditions. In particular,
in any linear Nash equilibrium the quantity bought by agent i, the payoff shock of agent i, the price p
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and the market power must satisfy the following condition:
qi =
E[θi|si, p]− p
1 + βN(1 + l)
. (23)
Heuristically, this relation can be derived from simply taking the first order condition of (1) with respect
to qi and replacing
∂p
∂qi








which describes the equilibrium price in terms of the equilibrium beliefs of the agents. This is suffi cient
to characterize the mean price.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Mean Price)
The expected price of any linear Nash equilibrium must satisfy:
µp =
Nβµθ
1 + βN(1 + l)
, (25)





The expected equilibrium price is then determined only by the mean payoff shock and the equi-
librium market power. In particular, there is a one-to-one relation between the mean price and the
equilibrium market power. The relation between market power and the mean price is derived by taking
the expectation of (24) and using the law of iterated expectations. The relation between the expected
equilibrium demand and the expected price is implied by the market clearing condition.
We now show how (23) and (24) provide additional restrictions on the second moments of any
equilibrium distribution.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Variance)





















We can see that the variance of the price and the variance of the quantities bought by agents is
determined by (i) the correlations ρpθ̄ and ρ∆q∆θ, and (ii) the market power. The market clearing
condition then imposes the relationship between the variance of price and quantity. The price volatility
is increasing with ρpθ̄ and thus the price volatility is driven by the average payoff shocks. Furthermore,
the price volatility is decreasing with l as more market power means that the agents trade less. By








The restriction (26) can now be derived directly from (25) and (29).
The variance of the aggregate quantity, σ2q , can be understood in a similar way. The expression
(27) identifies two components that contribute to the quantity volatility. The first component depends
only on the average quantity q̄ traded by agents. As the average quantity purchased by the agents is
collinear with the price, the intuition for this component is similar to the price volatility. In addition
to the contribution of the average quantity q̄, the variance of the quantity traded by agents is also
determined by the orthogonal component of the quantity traded by the agents; this is the second
component of (27). If the quantity traded by agent i is very volatile even when conditioning on q̄, then
this will contribute substantially to σq.
Finally, we can use the payoff environment and the symmetry condition to determine the remaining
moments of the distribution.
Lemma 3 (Statistical Conditions on the Distributions)
Every distribution of outcomes must satisfy






The previous lemma imposes several restrictions on the moments of a distribution of outcomes. The
constraints (30) and (31) are consistency requirements that arise only from the fact that the distribution
of quantities and payoff shocks is symmetric and that the price is collinear with the average quantity
traded by agents.
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5.3 How Private Information Determines the Moments
So far we approached the equilibrium outcomes of demand function competition by deliberately avoiding
the use of specific information structure that give rise to the equilibrium behavior. This contrasts with
the more conventional approach in the analysis of games with incomplete information. There, specific
assumption are made regarding the true information structure and the analysts solves the equilibrium
for a given information structure, or a class of parametrized information structures. In this subsection,
we indicate how to relate these two approaches. In particular, we define some parametrized classes
of information structures and describe the equilibrium outcomes they induce. For each information
structure we compute the triple (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ); the market power, the correlation between the price
and the average shocks and the correlation between the orthogonal components of quantities and payoff
shocks. In doing so, we link the representation of the equilibrium outcomes in Theorem 3 with specific
classes of parameterized information structures.
Recall that in Section 4.2, we studied three different information structures (one-dimensional noisy
signals, multi-dimensional noisy signals and confounding signals) in order to get intuition for how market
power and price volatility varied as we varied a one-dimensional parameter in natural information
structures. In this section, we complement the analysis therein by studying two additional information
structures: noise-free signals and canonical signals. The former allows us to decentralize the same
outcomes as the set of equilibria under complete information while the latter allows decentralizing all
equilibrium outcomes. Thus, they will give a complementary view of how the information structure
determines the equilibrium outcome. We also use the one-dimensional signals (studied in Section 4.2)
to help build intuition for how the canonical signals determine the equilibrium outcome.
Noise-Free Signals The class of noise-free signals decentralize all outcomes that arise under complete
information as a unique equilibrium under incomplete information, and we used them to establish
Theorem 1. Here, each agent i observes:






where γ ∈ R. In this case, the outcome of the demand function competition game is given by:
ρpθ̄ = 1, ρ∆θ∆q = 1, l = L(γ),
where the function L(·) is defined as follows:
L(γ) , 1
2βN
−Nβ (N − 1)γ − 1
(N − 1)γ + 1 − 1 +
√(
Nβ
(N − 1)γ − 1
(N − 1)γ + 1
)2








of market power and price volatility under noise-free signals.
Under the noise-free signals the correlations (ρpθ̄, ρ∆θ∆q) are equal to one. The noise free signals decen-
tralize the outcomes of the complete information equilibria in which there is no extraneous noise in the
outcomes – thus the correlations are equal to one. On the other hand the market power is determined
by the confounding parameter γ using the function L (γ), which we plot in Figure 5. We can see that
the range of L (γ) is [−1/2,∞), which implies that all market powers can be decentralized for some
γ. As γ → −1/(N − 1), L (γ) approaches an asymptote; for values γ < −1/(N − 1) the function is
negative; in the limit as γ →∞ the function L (γ) approaches 0.
Finally, we remark that (32) is not the same signal as (20). If we decompose the payoff shock in
terms of a common and an idiosyncratic component (as in (16)), then (32) would be written as follows:






Even though this signal and (20) look similar, the former decentralizes all the points in the red dashed
curve while the latter allows to decentralize the points in a blue curve in Figure 4. This serves as an
additional illustration of how small changes in an information structure may lead to large changes in
the equilibrium outcomes.
25
Canonical Signals The third class of signal combines elements of the noise-free signals and the
one-dimensional noisy signals. We assume that agent i observes a one-dimensional signal si given by:
si = θi + εi + (γ − 1)(θ̄ + ε̄). (33)
The term εi is a noise term that is independent of all payoff shocks {θi}i∈N , has a variance of σ2ε, and
a correlation ρεε across signals.
We refer to (33) as canonical signals because they allow us to decentralize all feasible outcomes. In
other words, for every distribution of outcomes that can be implemented by some information struc-
ture, it can also be implemented by a canonical information structure. The relevant moments of the
















The correlation coeffi cient are determined by the variance of the noise term in an analogous way to the
noisy one-dimensional signals. In contrast to the noisy one-dimensional signals, we now allow the noise
terms to be correlated across agents, which is incorporated in the computation of the correlations. The
market power combines the intuitions from the noise-free signals and the noisy one-dimensional signals;
here the market power is determined by both the confounding parameter and the correlations. It is
now easy to check that by varying (σ2ε, ρεε, γ) we can span all values of (ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ, l). Hence, these
canonical signals allow us to span all possible outcomes.
6 Cournot vs. Demand Function Competition
The competition in demand functions constitutes a market mechanism that balances demand and supply
with a uniform price across traders. As the competition in demand function is only one of many
mechanisms that match demand and supply on the basis of a uniform price, it is natural to compare the
outcome under demand function competition with other uniform price market mechanisms. A natural
candidate to consider is Cournot competition or competition in quantities.
We maintain the payoff environment as described in Section 2, but we now assume that the agents





The equilibrium trading behavior in quantity competition differs from demand function competition
in two important respects. First, in demand function competition the agents can make their trade
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contingent on the equilibrium price, whereas in quantity competition the demand has to be stated
unconditional. Second, in demand function competition the price impact of each agent depends on the
submitted demand function of all other agents, whereas in quantity competition the price impact is
constant and simply given by the supply conditions. We show how these two aspects induce important
differences in the set of possible outcomes across these two forms of market mechanisms, even when
we compare across all possible information structure.4 In recent work, Lambert, Ostrovksy, and Panov
(2018) consider how informationally sensitive the trading outcomes are in a hybrid model between
demand function competition and Cournot competition. They study the informational effi ciency of the
Kyle (1985) model in a high-dimensional model and their analysis also relies on the multivariate normal
structure of payoffs and signals.
We compare the set of feasible pairs of market power and price volatility for Cournot competition
and demand function competition. Similarly to the analysis of the demand function competition, we
can obtain a description of the equilibrium outcomes under all information structures. In this section










With demand function competition, this always coincides with the expectation of the ratio. Here, we
use this refined measure to convey most directly that under Cournot competition, the agents’market
power is constant.
Theorem 4 (Cournot Equilibria Under All Information Structures)








√1 + βσθ̄ +
√
(β + βN + 1)σ2∆θ + (1 + β)σ
2
θ̄√
1 + β(β + βN + 1)
2 . (34)
Moreover, all feasible pairs of market power and price volatility (l, σ2p) are induced by a unique equilibrium
for some information structure.
In Cournot competition the first moment of the individual and aggregate demand is independent of
the information structure. In particular, the market power is always equal to l = 1/N . By contrast, in
4 In an early version of this paper, Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2015a), we provide a more exhaustive comparison
of the equilibrium behavior across many uniform price mechanisms, including the Bertrand price mechanism, the Kyle
trading mechanism and noisy price mechanism.
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demand function competition, the set of feasible market powers is a one-dimensional object without an
upper bound.
Yet, under Cournot competition the maximum price volatility can be larger than under demand
function competition. From Theorem 2 we can infer that the maximum price volatility under demand






and the maximum price volatility under quantity competition is displayed in (34). In contrast to demand
function competition, the price volatility can grow even as the variance of the average payoff shock
shrinks. As the inequality in (34) documents, the maximal price volatility under quantity competition
grows if the contribution of the idiosyncratic component in the payoff shock increases, that is if 1− ρθθ
increases.
The extra degree of freedom that demand function competition has on the first moment is a re-
flection of the fact that market power is endogenously determined. The extra degree of freedom that
Cournot competition has in the second moments is reflective of the fact that the agents cannot con-
dition the quantity bought on the equilibrium price. Hence, there is less information that disciplines
the quantities bought by agents. In Cournot competition, the price volatility and the volatility in the
quantity demanded by the agents are not determined separately (as σ2p and σ
2
q in (26) and (27)) but
rather there is a single equation that jointly determines the volatility in the quantities demanded by
agents. This implies that the price volatility can increase with the absolute level of uncertainty about




the different behavior of the first and second moments across these market mechanism in Figure 6.
Most importantly, we see that for Cournot competition the level of market power is constant across
information structures, while with demand function competition the market power varies substantially
with the information structure.
The lack of common conditioning device in quantity competition also leads to fewer restriction on the
correlation coeffi cients that describe the entire matrix of second moments. With quantity competition
the set of feasible second moments is a three dimensional object. In particular, for any (ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ, ρqq) ∈
[0, 1]3, there exists an information structure that induces a distribution of outcomes under quantity
competition with correlations (ρpθ̄, ρ∆q∆θ, ρqq). Yet, for a fixed first moment, the set of possible second











Figure 6: Comparison of the first and second equilibrium moments under demand function competition
and quantity competition.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we study demand function competition. Our results provide positive and negative results
regarding our ability to make predictions in this form of market microstructure. On the one hand,
we showed that any market power is possible– from −1/2 to infinity. Considering small amounts of
incomplete information does not allow us to provide any sharper predictions, unless one is able to make
additional restrictive assumptions regarding the nature of the incomplete information. On the other
hand, we showed that we can provide many substantive predictions on the outcome of demand function
competition that are robust to the information structure.
The analysis in our paper provides a way of thinking about demand function competition in a more
abstract way. In particular, we analyze directly quantities and payoff shocks, abstracting from the
specific demands that are submitted in equilibrium. While this allows us to analyze demand function
competition, it may also be helpful to analyze other forms of market microstructure, and perhaps more
interestingly, to compare between them. We believe this may a fruitful direction for future work.
The comparison between demand function and Cournot competition indicates that distinct trading
mechanisms for the same allocation problem may respond surprisingly different to small changes in the
structure of private information.
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8 Appendix
We first present three lemmas that are used to prove the results in the main text.
Lemma 4 (Characterization of Linear Nash Equilibrium)
The demand function x(si, p) = c0 +
∑
j∈J cjsij −mp is a linear Nash equilibrium if and only if:







where λ is given by:
λ =
β
1 + βm(N − 1) , (36)
and it satisfies λ ≥ −1/2. The expectation E[θi|p, si] is computed using the induced price distribution,









Proof. We conjecture a symmetric linear Nash equilibrium in which agent i submits demand
function:




and show that this is a symmetric linear Nash equilibrium if and only if (35) and (36) are satisfied and
the equilibrium price is determined by (37)




















Thus (37) is satisfied.
We now examine agent i’s maximization problem. Given the demands submitted by other agents














A linear demand functions is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the demand function of agent i solves
(39). An alternative way to write the market clearing condition is to write it in terms of agent i’s







If agent i submits a demand xi(p), then market clearing implies that xi(p∗) = ri(p∗).
We first solve agent i’s maximization problem assuming that he knows his residual supply. This
corresponds to finding the quantity qi that maximizes agent i’s expected utility conditional on agent i’s
signals and agent i’s residual supply. If agent i knows his residual supply, then he solves:
max
qi∈R




where r−1i (·) is the inverse function of ri (defined in (40)). Note that the residual supply of agent i may
contain information about θi so this is added as a conditioning variable. In other words, in a linear





Hence, agent i can use the intercept of ri(p) as additional information about θi. Note that in a linear
Nash equilibrium the slope of ri(p) does not depend on the realization of the signals {sij}i∈N,j∈J .
Taking the first order condition of (41) we obtain:
E[θi|ri, si]− r−1(q∗i )− q∗i
∂r−1(q∗i )
∂q∗i
− q∗i = 0.










1 + βm(N − 1) ,
where the first equality is using the implicit function theorem and the second equality is taking the
derivative of (40) with respect to p. Note that the derivative of the inverse residual supply is equal to







The objective function of the maximization problem (41) is a quadratic function of qi and the coeffi cient
on the quadratic component is equal to −(λ+ 1/2). Thus, the second order conditions is satisfied if and
only if λ ≥ −1/2. It is clear that, if λ < 1/2 then the agent’s objective function is strictly convex and
hence (41) does not have a solution. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with λ > 1/2.
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If agent i knows his residual demand, then the first order condition can be written as follows:
q∗i =
E[θi|ri, si]− r−1(q∗i )
1 + λ
.
Note that r−1(q∗i ) is the equilibrium price:
p∗ = r−1(q∗i ).





Note that the equilibrium price p∗ is informationally equivalent to the intercept of the residual supply
faced by agent i. This is because p∗ is computed using ri and the demand function submitted by agent
i. Hence, for agent i, conditioning on the residual supply or the equilibrium price is informationally
equivalent. Hence, we can replace it as a conditioning variables.
In demand function competition agent i does not know his residual supply but an agent submits a





then he will buy the same quantity as if he knew his residual supply. Thus, for any set of linear demands
submitted by the other agents {xj(sj)}j 6=i, agent i′s best response is given by (42). The expectation
E[θi|p, si] is computed the same way as if p was the equilibrium price. That is, for any residual supply
ri(p), if agent i submits demand function (42), then p∗ is chosen to satisfy x(p∗) = ri(p∗). Hence, agent





which is the optimal quantity as if he knew his residual supply.








where λ is given by:
λ =
β
1 + βm(N − 1) ,
and where expectation E[θi|p, si] is computed the same way as if p was the equilibrium price.
Lemma 5 (Relation between Price Impact and Market Power)
In every symmetric linear Nash equilibrium where agents’price impact is λ, the induced market power
is l = λ/(βN).
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Rearranging terms, we obtain:
λx(si, p) = E[θi|p, si]− x(si, p)− p. (44)




x(si, p) = β
∑
i∈N
(E[θi|p, si]− x(si, p)− p). (45)
Note that x(si, p) is the quantity bought by agent i in equilibrium so the market clearing condition
implies that β
∑




E[θi − qi − p|p, si]. (46)
Here we wrote qi and p inside the expectation; this is possible because they are measurable with respect
to the conditioning variables. Taking the expectation of the previous equation conditional on p (i.e.




E[θi − qi − p|p], (47)







θi − qi − p
p
|p]. (48)









θi − qi − p
p
] = l, (49)
which establishes the result.
Lemma 6 (Continuum of Equilibria)















where γ̂ is defined as follows:
γ̂(λ) , (λ+ 1)(βN − λ)
λ(N − 1)(βN + λ+ 1) . (51)
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Rearranging terms, the equilibrium price can be written as follows:
p∗ =
βNθ̄
1 + λ+ βN
. (52)











































































Inverting the function, we obtain:
λ =
β
1 + βm(N − 1) .
Hence, (36) is also satisfied. Using Lemma 4, this establishes the linear Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1. In the proof of Lemma 6 we showed that in every symmetric linear
Nash equilibrium in which agents have price impact λ, the equilibrium price is given by (see (52)):
p∗ =
βNθ̄
1 + λ+ βN
.
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Moreover, we also proved that there exists an equilibrium in which agents have price impact λ for all
λ ≥ −1/2, which establishes the result.
Proof of Corollary 1. Lemma 5 states that in every symmetric linear Nash equilibrium in which
agents’have price impact λ, the induce market power is l = λ/(βN). In the proof of Lemma 6, we show
that in every symmetric linear Nash equilibrium in which agents’have price impact λ, the equilibrium
price is given by (see (52)):
p∗ =
βNθ̄
1 + λ+ βN
.




1 + λ+ βN
)2
var(θ̄),
which establishes the result.
Proof Theorem 1. We prove the result by decomposing the payoff shock, into two independent
payoff shocks:
θi , ηi + φi. (54)
We assume that the sets of payoff shocks {ηi}i∈N are independent of the shocks {φi}i∈N , the shocks are
jointly normally distributed, and:
µη = µφ =
µθ
2
and corr(ηi, ηj) = corr(φi, φj) = corr(θi, θj). (55)
Finally, we assume that the variance of the shocks {φi}i∈N is equal to ε:
var(φi) = ε and var(ηi) = (σ
2
θ − ε). (56)
We remark that (55) and (56) guarantee that:
var(φi + ηi) = σ
2
θ; cov(φi + ηi, φj + ηj) = cov(θi, θj),
and thus, the joint distribution of the random variables {ηi+φi}i∈N is equal to the the joint distribution
of the original payoff shocks {θi}i∈N .
We assume that every agent observes the realization of all shocks {ηi}i∈N . In other words, each
agent observes N signals, each signal being equal to one of the shocks ηi. Additionally, agent i observes
a signal that is equal to a weighted difference between his shock φi and the average of all shocks {φj}j∈N







Here γ ∈ R is any number in the real line. Throughout this proof si denotes only the one-dimensional
signal (57) and not the whole vector of signals an agent observes. We remark that under this information
structure:
∀i, j ∈ N, var(θi|η1, ..., ηN , sj) = var(φi|sj) ≤ var(φi) = ε.
It follows that under this information structure (12) is satisfied.
In any linear Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium price must be a linear function of the shocks {ηi}i∈N
and the signals {si}i∈N . The symmetry of the conjectured equilibrium, implies that there exists con-
stants ĉ0, ĉ1, ĉ2 such that the equilibrium price satisfies:
p∗ = ĉ0 + ĉ1φ̄+ ĉ2η̄.5
Regardless of the values of ĉ0, ĉ1, ĉ2 the following equation is satisfied:
E[θi|{ηi}i∈N , si, p∗] = θi.
That is, agent i can infer perfectly θi using the realization of the shocks {ηi}i∈N , the signal si and the
equilibrium price. This is because agent i can infer φ̄ from p∗, which in addition to si, allows agent i to
perfectly infer φi (note that η̄ is common knowledge).
Lemma 4 states that agent i submits demand function:
xi(p) =
E[θi|{ηi}i∈N , si, p∗]− p
1 + λ
,






for some λ ≥ −1/2. The market clearing condition implies that p∗ = β
∑
q∗i , and so the equilibrium
price is given by:
p∗ =
βNθ̄
1 + λ+ βN
, (59)
for some λ ≥ −1/2. Hence, the equilibrium price is measurable with respect to θ̄. That is, the equilibrium
price must satisfy that ĉ1 = ĉ2. It is important to clarify that the linearity and symmetry of the
conjectured equilibrium guarantees that the price is an affi ne function of η̄ and φ̄. Yet, since the
equilibrium price plus the private signals observed by agent i allows agent i to infer θi, the quantity
bought by agent i is measurable with respect to θi. Hence, using the linearity and the symmetry, the
price must be a linear function of θ̄. Note that for a fixed γ, the quantity bough by agent i and the price
5Recall that according to the notation introduced in the main text η̄ =
∑




are equal to (58) and (59) respectively. This is the same as the equilibrium under complete information
when agents have price impact λ (compare with (53) and (52)). Thus, we are only left with showing
that for a fixed γ there is a unique equilibrium and every price impact λ ≥ −1/2 is spanned by some
γ ∈ R.
Given the equilibrium price in (59) (as a function of λ), we can find an expression for E[θi|{ηi}i∈N , si, p∗]
(in terms of the conditioning variables). We first note that:(
p∗
βN
(1 + λ+ βN)− η̄
)
= φ̄.
Hence, the expectation can be written as follows:




(1 + λ+ βN)− η̄
)
= θi.
Recall that in equilibrium agent i submits demand function:
xi(p) =
E[θi|p∗, si, {ηi}i∈N ]− p
1 + λ
.











1− (1− γ) 1βN (1 + λ+ βN)
1 + λ
.
The previous equation gives a relation between agent i’s price impact (i.e. λ) and the slope of the
demand function submitted by agent i (i.e. m). Equation (36) is a second equation that relates λ and





− 1−Nβγ(N − 1)− 1
γ(N − 1) + 1 ±
√(
Nβ
γ(N − 1)− 1
γ(N − 1) + 1
)2
+ 2Nβ + 1
)
. (60)
Only the positive root is a valid solution as the negative root yields a λ less than −1/2 (which violates
the condition in Lemma 4). Hence, there is a unique equilibrium in which the price impact is equal to
the positive root of (60).
Finally, to show that the noise-free signals span the same outcomes as the outcomes under complete
information we need to show that for all λ ≥ −1/2, there exists a γ that satisfies (60) with the positive
root. To check this note that inverting (60) (using the positive solution), we have that γ as a function
of λ is given by (51). Hence, for any λ ≥ −1/2, if γ is given by (51), there exists a unique linear Nash
equilibrium in which the equilibrium outcome is the same as the equilibrium outcome under complete
information when the price impact is λ.
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Proof of Theorem 2. We prove necessity and suffi ciency separately.
“If” Part. Let (l, σ2p) be such that (13) is satisfied. We show that there exists an information
structure that induces this market power and price volatility as a unique equilibrium. Suppose the





ρθθ(N − 1) + 1
(1 + βN(1 + l))2
(βN)2
and var(φi) = (σ
2
θ − var(ηi)). (61)
Note that var(φi) (as defined in (61)) is always positive because the theorem states that:
σ2p ≤
(βN)2
(1 + βN(1 + l))2
σ2
θ
and so var(ηi) (as defined in (61)) is less or equal than var(θi). We assume that the payoff shocks {ηi}i∈N
are common knowledge (i.e. every agent observes all shocks {ηi}i∈N ) and agents have no information
on the realization of the shocks {φi}i∈N . This model is isomorphic to a model in which agents have
complete information and the only shocks are {ηi}i∈N .
Corollary 1 states that in the complete information equilibrium with price impact is λ the induced
market power is l = λ/β ·N and the price volatility is:
(βN)2








(1 + βN + λ)2
ρηη(N − 1) + 1
N
var(ηi).
Since var(ηi) is defined as in (61) and ρηη = ρθθ, the previous equation implies that the price volatility is
given by σ2p. Thus, there exists an equilibrium that induces (l, σ
2
p). In this equilibrium the shocks {ηi}∈N
are common knowledge and agents have no information on {φi}∈N . Under this information structure
the market power and price volatility (l, σ2p) are not induced as a unique equilibrium. However, the
model is isomorphic to a model of complete information in which the only shocks are {ηi}∈N . We
can then use Theorem 1, which states that this market power and price volatility are induced as the
unique symmetric linear Nash equilibrium for some information structure when agents have incomplete
information. This concludes the first part of the proof.

















Market clearing implies that β
∑
i∈N xi(p








Rearranging terms we obtain
p∗ =
βN






Taking the expectation of the previous equation conditional on p∗ (i.e., taking the expectation E[·|p∗])
and using the law of iterated expectations:
p∗ =
βN


















1 + λ+ βN
)
cov(p, θ).











≤ 1, this proves the necessity part for the price volatility. Lemma 4 shows that in any linear
Nash equilibrium agents’price impact is greater or equal than −1/2 (i.e. λ ≥ −1/2). Lemma 5 shows
that the induce market power is given by l = λ/(βN). Thus, the equilibrium market power satisfies
l = −1/(2βN). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first note that cov(∆θi, θ̄) = 0, which can be verified as follows:
cov(∆θi, θ̄) = cov(
∑
i∈N










cov(θi, θj)− cov(θi, θj) = 0. (68)
The explanations of the steps is as follows: (66) is by the definition of ∆θi, (67) is using the collinearity
of the covariance, and (68) is using the definition of θ̄ and the collinearity of the covariance. In an
analogous way it is easy to prove that cov(∆θi, q̄) = cov(∆qi, θ̄) = cov(∆qi, q̄) = 0.



































1 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 −1/(βN)








Thus by characterizing the joint distribution of variables (∆θi, θ̄,∆qi, p) we are also characterizing the
joint distribution variables of (θi, θ, qi, p).
“If”Part. We fix a triple (l̂, ρ̂pθ̄, ρ̂∆q∆θ) ∈ [−1/2,∞)×[0, 1]×[0, 1] that satisfies (22) and show there
exists an information structure that induces this triple. We consider a set of N normally distributed













(−Nρ̂2∆q∆θρθθ + ρθθ − 1) + (N − 1)ρ̂2∆q∆θρθθ + ρ̂2∆q∆θ
ρ̂2
pθ̄
(−N(ρ̂2∆q∆θ + ρθθ − 1) + ρθθ − 1) + (N − 1)ρ̂2∆q∆θρθθ + ρ̂2∆q∆θ
.
















where ε̄ and∆εi are defined in an analogous way to θ̄ and∆θi. The only relevant part of the construction
of the noise terms is that (70) is satisfied; the specific definitions of σ2ε and ρεε are not used again
throughout the proof. We assume agents observe a one-dimensional signal as follows:
si = (∆θi + ∆εi) + γ(θ̄ + ε̄), (71)
were γ is given by:
γ =
(l̂βN + 1)(βN − l̂βN)





The variance and correlation of the noise terms plus the definition of the signal (71) completely deter-
mines the information structure. We now show that the induced equilibrium triple is (l̂, ρ̂pθ̄, ρ̂∆q∆θ).
Consistent with the notation previously used we define:
s̄ , γ(θ̄ + ε̄) and ∆si , ∆θi + ∆εi.
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The random variables (θ̄, ε̄, s̄) are orthogonal to (∆θi,∆εi,∆si) (the proof is analogous to (66)-(68)) so




































In any linear Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium price must be a linear function of the signals {si}i∈N .
Using the symmetry of the conjectured equilibrium, we have that in any symmetric linear Nash equi-
librium, there exists constants ĉ0, ĉ1 such that the equilibrium price satisfies:







E[θi|si, p∗] = E[θi|si, s̄].





for some λ ≥ −1/2. Replacing the expression for the expectation (73) in (76) and using the market

















i∈N ∆si = 0 so the terms with ∆si cancel out in the previous expression when we sum over










1 + λ+ βN
. (77)
Because p∗ is collinear with s̄, it is immediate that:








Since σ2ε and ρεε were chosen so that (70) is satisfied, we have that the correlation between the price









Because ∆q∗i is collinear with ∆si it is immediate that:






Since σ2ε and ρεε were fixed so that (70) is satisfied, we have that the correlation between the ∆qi and
∆θi is ρ̂∆q∆θ; as desired. Therefore, the induced correlations by the equilibrium are (ρ̂pθ̄, ρ̂∆q∆), which
is the desired quantities. We now show that the equilibrium market power is l̂.
Given the equilibrium price in (77), we can find an expression for the expected value of θi conditional







si + (1− γ̃)
p∗
βN
(1 + λ+ βN)
)
. (79)
The previous equation is obtained by rewriting (75) in terms of p∗ instead of s̄. Recall that in equilibrium





Using the expression for the expectation (79) we write the slope of the demand submitted by agent i
as follows:
m =
1− (1− γ̃) 1βN (1 + λ+ βN)
1 + λ
. (80)






− 1−Nβ γ̃(N − 1)− 1
γ̃(N − 1) + 1 ±
√(
Nβ
γ̃(N − 1)− 1
γ̃(N − 1) + 1
)2
+ 2Nβ + 1
)
. (81)
Only the positive root is a valid solution as the negative root yields a λ less than −1/2, which violates
the condition in Lemma 4. Hence, for a fixed γ, there is a unique symmetric linear Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we show that the definition of γ̃ implies that the induced market power is l (as conjectured).






(l̂βN + 1)(βN − l̂βN)
l̂βN(N − 1)(βN(1 + l̂) + 1)
.
Replacing the previous expression of γ̃ into the expression for the price impact (i.e. (81)), we obtain
that the price impact is given by:
λ = l̂βN.
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However, Lemma 5 shows that in this case the equilibrium market power is l̂; which is the desired
induced market power.
“Only If Part” Lemma 4 states that in any linear Nash equilibrium the price impact is greater or
equal than -1/2 and Lemma 5 states that the price impact is equal to the market power divided by
(βN). Thus in any linear Nash equilibrium the market power satisfies l ≥ −1/(2βN).
In the proof of Theorem 2 we established that (see (64)):
p∗ =
βN








1 + λ+ βN
E[θ̄|p∗]. (82)
Observe that p∗ appears on the left-hand-side and as a conditioning variable on the right-hand-side,
and thus, corr(p∗, θ̄) ≥ 0. A statistical condition of a correlation is that corr(p∗, θ̄) ≤ 1. Therefore, in
any linear Nash equilibrium corr(p∗, θ̄) ∈ [0, 1].






We now use that, xi(p∗) = qi (i.e. xi(p∗) is the quantity bought by agent i in equilibrium) and market
clearing implies p∗ = Nβq̄, thus







βNE[θi|si, p∗]− (1 + λ+ βN)p∗
βN(1 + λ)
, (84)
We now observe that (∆qi, p∗) is measurable with respect to (si, p∗). Taking expectation of the previous
equation conditional on (∆qi, p∗) (i.e., taking expectation E[·|∆qi, p∗]) and using the law of iterated
expectations we get:
∆qi =
βNE[θi|∆qi, p∗]− (1 + λ+ βN)p∗
βN(1 + λ)
, (85)
Using (64) we have that
p∗ =
βN








1 + λ+ βN
E[θ̄|p∗].










Observe that ∆qi appears on the left-hand-side and as a conditioning variable on the right-hand-side
and so corr(∆θi,∆qi) ≥ 0. A statistical condition of a correlation is that corr(∆θi,∆qi) ≤ 1. Therefore,
in any linear Nash equilibrium corr(∆θi,∆qi) ∈ [0, 1].
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“Uniqueness of Distribution”. Finally, we prove that for every (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆θ) ∈ [−1/(βN2),∞) ×
[0, 1] × [0, 1] there exists a unique distribution that is the outcome of a linear Nash equilibrium. For
this we note that the only coeffi cients missing in distribution (69) are σp, σ∆q and µp. In Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 we show that these are uniquely determined by (l, ρpθ̄, ρ∆θ).
Proof of Lemma 1 . We rewrite (63) for the convenience of the reader:
p∗ =
βN






Taking expectations of the previous equation and using the law of iterated expectations we get:
µp =
βN
1 + λ+ βN
µθ̄. (89)











Symmetry implies that E[qi] = E[qj ], and so we get µp = βNµq.



















































where we once again use Lemma 5 to write λ in terms of l. Finally, we note that σ2∆θ = σ
2
θ − σ2θ̄, and
so we get the second equation.
To prove the last equation note that the price is collinear with the price, and hence:
σp = βNσq̄.
We now use that σq̄ = ρqq̄σq = ρqpσq and conclude that σp = βNρqpσq.






cov(θj , p) = cov(θ̄, p).
It follows that ρθpσθσp = ρθ̄pσθ̄σp. We now note that cov(θ̄, θ̄) = cov(θ̄, θi), which implies that σθ̄ =
ρθθ̄σθ. Therefore, we get ρθp = ρθ̄pρθθ̄.






cov(qj , θ̄) = cov(q̄, θ̄).
We therefore get that ρqθ̄σqσθ̄ = ρq̄θ̄σq̄σθ̄. We also have that σq̄ = ρqq̄σq (this can be proved the same
way as we proved that σθ̄ = ρθθ̄σθ). Since q̄ is collinear with p, ρq̄θ̄ = ρpθ̄ and ρqq̄ = ρqp. Hence, we get
























The definition of the covariance is given by (94). (95) follows from:
cov(∆qi,∆θi) = cov(qi − q̄, θi − θ̄) = cov(qi, θi)− cov(q̄, θ̄),
where the symmetry of the distribution is used to show that cov(q̄, θ̄) = cov(qi, θ̄) = cov(q̄, θi). The








q (note that p
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is collinear with q̄ and so ρpq = ρq̄q). The denominator of (97) is found as follows:









θ. The variance σ
2
∆q is calculated in an analogous way. (98) is
obtained after simplifying the variances. This proves (31).
Proof of Theorem 4. We first show that for all (l, σ2p) that satisfy (34) with equality, there
exists an information structure that induced this market power and this price volatility. In a linear
Nash equilibrium of the Cournot competition game an agent’s best response is given by:




The previous equation corresponds simply to the first order condition of (1) where we replace p =
β
∑
j∈N qj . Because qi is measurable with respect to si, we can take qi outside of the expectation. We
can write the first order condition as follows:








qi = p =
∑
i∈N




Here we used that market clearing implies that β
∑
i∈N qi. Taking expectations of the previous equation




















Therefore, the market power is constant and equal to 1/N . To prove that the price volatility is less or
equal than the expression in (34) we consider the following noise-free signals:
si = θi − (1− λ)θ̄.















The equilibrium price is given by β
∑


























√1 + βσθ̄ +
√
(β + βN + 1)σ2∆θ + (1 + β)σ
2
θ̄√
1 + β(β + βN + 1)
2 .
This is the upper bound found in Theorem 4. By using the same arguments as in Bergemann, Heumann,
and Morris (2015b) it is possible to show that all information structures yield a weakly lower price
volatility, which establishes the result. Moreover, decomposing the payoff shock in an analogous way
to that in the proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, it is easy to check that all price volatilities can be
achieved by some information structure.
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